This paper reviews the literature on the impact of ethnic diversity on economic development. Ethnically polarized societies are less likely to agree on the provision of public goods and more likely to engage in rent seeking activities providing lower levels of social capital. Initial conditions are important determinants of adverse development outcomes. The role of decentralization, democracy and markets as potential remedies are discussed. The paper then presents a number of preliminary hypotheses on the relationship between diversity and instability in order to stimulate future research.
I. Introduction
There seems to be a general consensus, based on both cross-country regressions and individual country studies, that ethnic diversity, especially in the Sub-Saharan African context, is one of the causal factors behind relatively poor development performance. While much of the past relevant literature focuses on diversity's impact on economic growth, we also have evidence that it adversely affects income distribution, poverty as well as human development. But much less is known about the impact of such diversity on economic stability or instability in Africa, which is the main focus of this activity.
It is generally accepted that more than two thousand ethnic groups, generally lacking the ability to exit from that condition, find themselves in Sub-Saharan Africa, a fact which can be taken as exogenous, although some have expressed the view that landlocked conditions may have contributed to such marked ethnic diversity. There is also agreement that it would be a mistake to talk about "the" African economy without distinguishing at least between natural resource rich country cases, coastal cash crop exporters, and the land-locked, internally oriented, economies, each encompassing approximately one-third of the total population of Sub-Saharan Africa.
We intend to proceed as follows: In section II we summarize some of what seems to be known in the literature with respect to the impact of diversity, however defined, on development. In section III we present some preliminary hypotheses about diversity and economic volatility. Finally, in section IV, we will briefly summarize and suggest some research priorities.
II.

Diversity and Development
Following Barro's lead, 1 some people have detected no unique African explanation for Africa's poor performance but blame it all on poor policies, the wellknown violations of Washington Consensus strictures, including the lack of openness, low savings rates, flawed monetary and fiscal policies, as well as lack of access to the sea, a tropical climate, Dutch disease, corruption and sometimes even the kitchen sink. With respect to the initial conditions, the relative abundance of land and the low level of population density have already been referred to. While we are ready to accept kinship relationships as exogenously given, there can be little doubt that they are a substitute for social security networks and that any inequality in the initial distribution of land and other assets historically permitted clan elites to capture the commanding heights of politics. Unlike the case of the more homogeneous Asian superfamilies, we have here smaller kinship-loyal families, sustaining cooperation within the group, but without altruism travelling across ethnicities. Consequently, increased diversity leads to less collective action with respect to public goods and, at the aggregate level, to more engagement in free-riding, consequent lower growth and some of the other aforementioned adverse developmental outcomes. As Avner Greif 16 has also emphasized, citing European historical evidence, legal and political institutions foster intra-elite cooperation but inter-group non-cooperation. The same asymmetry exists with respect to social capital, relatively strong within ethnic groups but not extending across these groups. Within groups, there is bonding going on, which is relatively weak across groups. Bridging across groups is, of course, difficult, even if better for optimization in the economic sense. The larger the extent of diversity the more bonding, and the less bridging.
The strength of natural resource endowments represents an important dimension of the initial conditions. Natural resources are an important cause of the likely asymmetry between different ethnic groups, depending on the vagaries of nature and culminating in the reduced incentive of those blessed with relative abundance to provide public goods to others. In Nigeria, for example, a minority ethnic group sitting on oil is 16 Greif, Avner, 1993. demanding a larger provision of national public goods, currently creating conflict.
Moreover, the resource-dominant groups are likely to suffer from some manifestation of the so-called natural resource curse, encouraging rent-seeking and weakening the pressure for economic or institutional reforms, all of which, of course, contributes to sustained unequal distributions of income, both of the vertical and horizontal type. In this setting, local public goods are always preferred over national public goods and the same sort of asymmetries affect the overall quality of social capital which is based on intensive trust within rather than across groups. scarce and are fought over. To conclude that democracy has little impact on growth but could have an impact on stability is a subject to which we shall return.
Since the role of markets is an important issue for our project, in the private sector minority kinship groups benefit from its relative impersonality while, in the public sector, minority kinship groups are disadvantaged and majorities benefit. Therefore, the ruling elite usually prefers the public sector, even if it is less efficient. With respect to particular production sectors, in agriculture the majority of kinship groups usually eschew social capital beyond their own jurisdiction. In industry, where minority groups are likely to gravitate, they benefit from the relatively larger, more urban, private activity. Hence, for any given distribution of political and economic resources one might expect a more market oriented, arms length, impersonal system to be superior in terms of developmental outcomes. However, markets may also accentuate or even create horizontal inequalities, especially given an initial unequal distribution of natural resources 27 . Moreover, a strong market orientation is often associated with a lower level of public goods and thus gives minorities less of an obligation to respect the state in terms of taxes or any other indication of support.
III. Diversity and Volatility
In this section, given the fact that very little research to date has focused on the relationship between diversity and instability, we intend to present a number of preliminary hypotheses which may possibly help stimulate future research in the context of this project. It is probably useful to differentiate here again among three types, the natural resource rich countries, those which have access to the oceans and depend on primary product exports and those which are landlocked and probably rank among the poorest.
There can be little doubt that the unequal distribution of natural resource wealth across different clans can be a cause of instability, as those who are not favored by nature are likely to object and provoke political instability, leading to economic instability.
There is clearly a tendency for those blessed by nature to deny public goods to the rest of the body politic across ethnic borders, if only to yield sporadically, when under pressure.
This may be one reason why it has been found in several empirical studies that the intermediate level of diversity, as measured by the ELF, leads to the worst case of political instability and, therefore, economic instability.
Turning to primary producing countries with access to trade, terms of trade fluctuations can be expected to be a major source of instability, especially affecting the commercially advantaged clans relative to those who are less advantaged. There is ample evidence that terms of trade fluctuations have very much affected growth in Sub-Saharan Africa and it would not require a lot of additional research to show that, within particular countries, the more diverse the society, the more likely that terms of trade fluctuations will lead to fluctuations in development, including growth, poverty and income distribution outcomes since they are bound to affect different groups differentially.
Exposure to terms of trade volatility indeed is 50% higher in Sub-Saharan Africa than in other developing countries, after controlling for differences in incomes per capita. Food insecurity, also unequally affecting different clans and currently on the rise, can similarly enhance economic volatility and needs to be analyzed. With respect to all three types of African countries, including the land-locked, it can be assumed that frequent political turnover and regime change, which has been an endemic feature of much of Sub-Saharan Africa, leads not only to political but also economic instability. It should not be difficult to trace the number of coups, changes in governments, even in ministers of finance, as causal agents in this respect. Oscillation between a market orientation and a controls orientation in policy, which is often referred to as sub-optimal for development generally, can also be considered a likely cause of 28 Easterly, William, Kremer, Michael, Pritchett, Lant & Summers, Lawrence H., 1993. Another source of instability results from the gradual shift in much of SubSaharan Africa from traditional communal land ownership, with virtually unlimited supplies of land, to private ownership and modern property rights, as land shortage, combined with population increase, leads to titling, insecurity and volatility.
29 Lijphart, Arend, 1977. 30 Kimenyi, Mwangi S., 2006. Other agents of globalization may well contribute to economic instability. Aid-funded projects are likely to induce rent-seeking, favor the affluent, weaken the social fabric, and represent instability -creating exogenous shocks.
d) NGOs, which are increasingly numerous in quantity and influential in terms of resources, but weak in terms of cohesion and accountability, are also often found to be competing with each other and jockeying for favor among various ethnic groups, thus making a contribution to an increase in volatility.
e)
Finally, it is generally acknowledged that global warming has been associated with an increased incidence of different kinds of natural disaster.
As such exogenous shocks become more frequent they are prone to contribute increasingly to instability in Sub-Saharan Africa, customarily affecting the poorer groups as well as different ethnic groups disproportionately. Receding rangelands, a consequence of desertification, is threatening the livelihood of pastoralists. Drying rivers are reducing cultivatable lands. This is causing inter-community or ethnic conflicts, and producing "climate change refugees." In other words, climate change will likely lead to increased economic instability in the ethnically diverse countries of Africa.
IV. Concluding Thoughts
In conclusion, it should be amply clear that we know a good deal about the impact of diversity on development, mostly on growth, but that we have relatively little evidence to date on the impact of diversity on instability. Therefore this particular project seems to have ample room for making a substantial contribution. It is suggested that careful attention be given to decentralization which may be stabilizing if it is accompanied by fiscal devolution, but not if the center retains the bulk of resources and is able to favor culturally aligned groups and those already favored by nature at the local level. Thus, the best sequence seems to be economic reforms followed by both political and fiscal decentralization. Comparative studies of constitutions and the extent of adherence to them are relevant. The role of foreign capital, especially foreign aid and NGO flows, possibly, but not necessarily, contributing to instability, needs to be examined.
The basic normative issue before us is how enhanced and non volatile trust can be generated in the presence of diversity and how the related issue of sustainably encouraging the provision of national public goods can best be tackled. This is where economic historians, anthropologists, political scientists and development economists can most usefully apply their combined talents. As Jean-Philippe Platteau, 31 aptly put it "how generalized trust… can be established … is probably one of the most challen questions confronting development scholars." ging 31 Platteau, Jean-Phiilippe, 1994. 
